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I. INTRODUCTION
For almost a generation, the People's Republic of China (PRC)
operated under a socialist legal system unique among its fellow
Communist countries, with neither a criminal code, a criminal procedure code, or lawyers. Judges were not required to have had legal
training, nor were they required or expected to cite legal provisions
in rendering judgments. For a considerable time, this ''unique legal
system" had greatly impressed some Western visitors. One American judge, for example, after visiting the PRC in 1975, expressed the
view that "in this new society [of the PRC] ... serious crime is a
rarity, juvenile delinquency nearly nonexistent and lawyers virtually
unnecessary . . . . Jails are few and their populations small. The
trappings of a restrictive regime are absent . . . . Maoist socialism
has produced a new society . . . ." 1 An American law professor expressed a similar view after a visit in 1977 by writing that "[f]ull
• Professor of Law, University of Maryland, School of Law, Baltimore, Maryland.
l. George W. Croketeet, Jr., "Criminal Justice in China," Judicature, Vol. 59, No. S
(December 1975), p. 247.
·

(1)
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employment and a fairly uniform standard of living reduce the motivation for crime ...." 2
Then, unexpectedly, beginning in 1978, virtually all the Chinese
media, from official newspapers and publications to wall posters, the
underground press and other sources, burst out with numerous reports relating angry complaints of arbitrary imprisonment or execution carried out under official authority. These publications set forth
the people's demands for human rights, democracy, and other legal
rights and protections. Since that time barely a day has passed without a report in an official publication of the reversal of a verdict
against an innocent person who had been convicted and imprisoned
or executed before 1977. The ·~new society'' described by the abovementioned two American visitors was labeled by an official PRC
English-language publication as "feudal depotism married to 20thcentury fascism." 3 The PRC authorities frankly acknowledged that
China's legal system was manifestly imperfect and badly in need of
reform. The Communique of the Third Plenary Session of the 11th
Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (December 18
and 22, 1978) set the goals of China's legal reform as follows:
In order to safeguard people's democracy, it is imperative
to strengthen the socialist legal system so that democracy is
systematized and written into law in such a way as to ensure the stability, continuity and full authority of this democratic system and these laws; there must be laws for
people to follow, these laws must be observed, their enforcement must be strict and law breakers must be dealt
with. From now on, legislative work should have an important place on the agenda of the National People's Congress and its Standing Committee. Procuratorial and
judicial organizations must maintain their independence as
is appropriate; they must faithfully abide by the laws, rule
and regulations, serve the people's interests, keep to the
facts; guarantee the equality of all people before the people's laws and deny anyone the privilege of being above the
law. 4

With surprising speed, the PRC enacted several important laws
2. Derrick Bell. "Inside China: Continuity and Social Reform, "Juris Doctor, Vol.
8, No. 4 (April 1978), p. 26.
3. "Prospect and Retrospect, China's Socialist Legal System," Beijing Review, Vol.
22, No. 2 (January 12, 1979), p. 27.
4. "Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation (October-December 1978)," The ClriPio
Quarterly, No. 77 (March 1979), p. 172.
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in 1979, including an Arrest and Detention Law, 5 a Criminal Law, a
Criminal Procedure Law, an Organic Law of the People's Court and
an Organic Law of the People's Procuratorates. 6 Immediately after
the promulgation of these laws, a national publici!_( campaign was
begun to make the laws known to all the people. Every leading
daily in the country has published the full texts of these laws, together with explanatory articles and commentaries. Some papers
have published special columns answering questions concerning the
laws and explaining legal terms. Legal ~riodicals, which ceased to
publish in 1966, began to appear again. Several popular and easyto-understand books on law were published. 9 Never before in the
30-year history of the PRC had law and the legal system so widely
interested the general public and the government. This paper analyzes and discusses the present state of PRC legal reform, the direction which that reform is likely to take, and the extent to which PRC
legal practice is likely to retain its pre-1979 features.
To understand the recent legal reform and its limits, one must
appreciate how the legal system operated before 1979. Accordingly,
this analysis begins with an overview of the Chinese legal system in
the pre-1979 period.
II. THE LEGAL SYSTEM BEFORE 1979 AND THE NEED
FOR REFORM

The Communique of the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the Communist Party (December 18 and 22, 1978)
sets forth the contents of the proposed law reform in sixteen Chinese
characters-Youfa keyi, Youfa biyi, Zhifa biyan, Weifa bijiu (there
must be laws for people to follow, these laws must be observed, their
enforcement must be strict, and law breakers must be dealt with). 10
5. "Regulations for Arrest and Detention," Beijing Review, Vol. 22, No. 10 (March
9, 1979), p. 4. Complete text released by New China New agency on February 24, 1979.
6. See Peng Zhen, "Explanation on Seven Laws," Beijing Review, Vol. 22 No. 29
(July 20, 1979), pp. 8-16.
7. See "Publicizing the New Laws," Beijing Review, Vol. 22, No. 29 (July 20, 1979),
pp. 3-4.
8. E.g., Faxue Yanjiu (Studies in law), Minzltu yu Fazlti (Democracy and legal system), Renmin Gongan (People's public security), Renmin Jianclta (People's
procuratorate), Rmmin S!fa (People's judiciary), and Fazlti Bao (Legal system daily).
9. E.g., Chen Qunlong et al., Falu zlti.rlti wmda (Questions and answers on law),
Beijing: Beijing chupanshe, 1979, and Zhang Youyu and Wang Shuwen, Falujihen zltislti
jianglrua (talks on basic knowledge of law). Beijing: Zhong guo qingnienchubanshe,
1980.
10. See note 4, supra.
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These sixteen character words also concisely expressed some basic
problems of China's legal system before 1979 which are discussed
one by one below.

1. There Must be Law for People to Follow.
Before the formal inauguration of the PRC on October 1, 1949,
the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference adopted the
Common Program 11 which served as a provisional constitution until
the adoption of a formal constitution on September 20, 1954. The
Common Program abolished all former Republic of China (Nationalist) laws, 12 but the PRC did not itself enact substantive and procedural civil and criminal laws to replace those it had abolished. The
only important criminal legislation enacted before the effective date
of the present Criminal Law, January 1, 1980, was the Act for the
Punishment of Counterrevolutionaries of the PRC, promulgated on
February 21, 195l.U Two articles of the latter Act deserve special
attention. First, Article 18 made the Act retroactive to cover "preliberation" activities, i.e., acts committed before the establishment of
the PRC in 1949. 14 Second, Article 16 set forth the principle of
crime by analogy:
Persons who have committed other crimes with counterrevolutionary intent that are not specified in the law shall be
punished according to analogous specified crimes in the
Act. 15
The lack of a comprehensive criminal code and detailed statutes
did not hamper the work of the people's courts since they were frequently instructed to follow orders or policies of the government or
the party in cases not covered by existing laws. 16
11. For an English translation of the Common Program. see Yuan-li Wu, ed., China:
A Hantlhook, New York: Praeger, 1973, pp. 789-98.
12. Article 17 of the Common Program.
13. For an English translation of the Act, see Jerome Alan Cohen, The Criminal Process In the People's Repuhlic oj China, 1949-1961, An Introducdon, Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1968, pp. 299-302.
14. Ibili., p. 302.
15. Ibid
16. E.g., Article 4 of the 1951 Provisional Organic Regulations of the People's Courts
in the PRC. See Shao-chuan Leng, Justice In Communist China, Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.:
Oceana, 1967, p. 32. In an interview conducted by a German correspondent with some
Chinese officials in 1974, the Chinese acknowledged that "the principles on which the
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In judicial practice, the people's courts usually did not indicate
the particular law or provisions according to which a given judgment
was rendered. Generally, a judgment did not indicate to the accused
what provision of law he or she was convicted ofviolating, 17 and, in
fact, the court was not even required to give a copy of the judgment
to him or her. 18 Other procedural safeguards that were lacking included a statutory time limit on detention of an accused. 19
Needless to say, the flexibility of the system necessarily led to
governmental and party abuse of judicial power, which resulted in
persecution of the people, including loyal communist party members. First, the cadres created multifarious and inconsistent "local
laws" and "local policies" in different parts of the country under the
guise of implementing party policies for the administration of justice
and maintenance of the social order. 20
Second, because crimes and offenses lacked reasonably precise
definitions in law and policy, individuals were in many instances
subjected to severe punishment without knowing what actions they
had taken that constituted a punishable offense. For instance, in
1968 an old woman was sentenced to death and executed because
she had served as a matchmaker in arranging the marriages of three
female youths who happened to have been on the list of persons to
be sent to the rural area for settlement. The charge was that, by
arranging such marriages, she had undermined the party policy of
sending educated youth to settle in rural areas (Xiafan). 21 Recent
PRC publications have revealed that in many places, "an official's
will is the law'' 22 because he alone can define what is legal and illegal
before or after an act is committed.
Third, there were some laws which so vaguely and flexibly defined offenses as to be virtually no law at all. For instance, in Janucourt's work are based are Party policy and the law of the state." See Gerd Ruge, "An
Interview with Chinese Legal Officials," Tire China Quarterly, No. 61 (March 1975), p.
118.
17. See, e.g., the translation of several court notices in Hungdah Chiu, "Criminal
Punishment in Mainland China: A Study of Some Yunnan Province Documents," Journal of Criminal Law cf Criminology, VoL 66, No. 3 (1977), pp. 392-398.
18. See Sheng Zhuhong, "Human Rights and Legal System," Minzhuyu Fazhi, 1979,
No.2, p. 20.
19. See Amnesty International Repon, Political Imprisonment in the People's Republic
of China, London, 1978, p. 49.
20. Chen Qunlong et al., supra note 9, p. 26.
21. Wang Ruowang, "Jokes Should Not Be Considered as 'Law'," Minzhu yu Fazhi,
1980, No. 1, pp. 25-26.
22. See, e.g. , Zheng Liwen, "Practice is the Only Criterion for Evaluating Legal Theory," Faxue Yanjiu, 1978 Preliminary Issue, p. 23.
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ary 1967, the State Council issued a decree which is usually referred
to as the "Six Articles on Public Security." This decree, inter alia,
defined "malicious attack" on leaders as "current counterrevolutionary activities" punishable "according to law." Many people were severely punished or imprisoned under this decree for such gossip as
that Lin Biao was not well-built or that Jiang Qing was not the first
wife of Mao; others were punished merely for shouting a wrong
slogan. 23
Fourth, because the definitions of criminal offenses did not include an element of mens rea (criminal intent), many unintentional
or accidental acts were severely punished, for example, in the socalled "damaging precious [Mao's] picture" cases. 24 Regardless of
the actor's intention, anyone who even accidentally or unintentionally broke or damaged Mao's picture was severely punished. In one
case, a cadre who used a newspaper to wrap an article and accidentally broke the paper which contained Mao's picture was sentenced
to 8 years imprisonment on a charge of engaging in counterrevolutionary activity. 25 In another case, a 19 year-old youth was sentenced to 18 years imprisonment on a charge of "malicious attack"
on the "Great Leader'' because he placed three crickets on the table
of one of his fellow workers for fun but behind that table there happened to be a picture of Mao. 26
Fifth, the lack of applicable law also caused serious problems in
settling disputes27 among state enterprises, which resulted in the disruption of production quotas.
2.

The Law Must be Observed.

Even if there is a law governing a particular matter, it can be
23. Yu Haocheng, "The 'Offense of Malicious Attack' and 'Six Articles of Public
Security'," Minzku yu Fazlti, 1919, No. 1, p. 36. a Nanjing worker got five years imprisonment merely because he inadvertently commented in public on Lin Biao's build.
"Prospect and Retrospect, China's Socialist Legal System," supra note 3, p. 27. This type
of punishment existed even before the Cultural Revolution. In 1958, a twelve-year-old
youth was sentenced to five years imprisonment for allegedly shouting wrong slogans in a
parado-"Oppose World Peace" and ''Oppose U.S. withdrawal from Lebanon." Liu
Rong, "Am I a Counterrevolutionary?" Minzltu yu Fazlti, 1919, No.2, p. 39.
24. Wei Kemin, "Be Cautious! Be Cautious!" Minzltu yu Fazhi, 1980, No. 11, p. 27.
25. Tao Xijjin, "Problems in the Study of Criminal Law," Faxue Yanjiu, 1979, No.5,
~~

.

26. Ma Jian, "Three Crickets and Eighteen Years Imprisonment," Minzltuyu Fazhi,
1980, No. 10, p. 38.
27. See Yang Zixuan, Tian Jianhua and Kou Mengliang, "Report on the Enlargement of the Power of Decision of Enterprises and the Strengthening of Economic Legislation," Faxue Yanjiu, 1980, No. 2, p. 57.
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totally disregarded or overruled by a Party policy. There are too
many examples of this process to cite them all. The most notorious
case involved the removal of Liu Shao-ch'i from his position as the
Chairman of the People's Republic of China by a decision of the
Communist Party of China. Article 28 of the 1954 Constitution,
which provides for the removal of the Chairman by the National
People's Congress, was totally disregarded. Before his removal, Liu
was arrested in total disregard of Article 89 of the 1954 Constitution
which provided that "no citizen may be arrested except by decision
of a people's court or with the approval of a people's procuracy" and
of Article I of the 1954 Arrest and Detention Act. 28 Later, Liu was
abused to death without any legal procedure.
During mass movements or campaigns, legal procedures were
often totally disregarded and ad hoc organs were set up to arrest,
investigate and detain alleged offenders for unlimited periods. 29
Even a clear provision of law on a given subject can be repealed
by Party policy. For instance, the 1950 Marriage Law specifically
provided that the minimum marriage ages for males and females
were, respectively, 20 and 18 years. Later, the Party decided to raise
those ages to 28 years for males and 26 for females, in total disregard
ofthe widely publicized 1950 Marriage Law. 30
3. Law E'!forcement Must Be Strict and Law Breakers Must
Be Dealt With.

In the PRC, the enforcement of law depends upon three extralegal factors:
(i) Whether the accused or the victim belongs to the
five categories of elements-former landlords, former rich
peasants, counterrevolutionaries, rightists and bad elements. A person in one of the five categories, or a descendant of such a person, would receive more severe
punishment in a criminal case than would a person outside
these categories. On the other hand, where the victim of a
crime was from one of the five categories of elements and
the malfeasor had a good class background, the offender
28. The Act is translated in Cohen, supra note 13, p. 361.
29. See Beijing zhengfa xueyuan susong fa qiaoyan shi, Zhonghua renmin gonghequo
xinshi susongfa jianghua (Talks on the criminal procedure law of the People's Republic
of China), Beijing: Qunzhong Chubanshe, 1979, p. 20. (Hereafter cited as Talks on
Criminal Procedure.)
30. Yu Haocheng, "The Promulgation of the New Marriage Law and Handling
Cases According to Law," Minzltu yu Fazhi, 1980, No. 10, p. II.
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received lenient punishment or no punishment at all. This
principle applied even to such serious offenses as rape or
homicide. 31
(ii) Whether the accused or the victim is a member of
the Communist Party of China. Party members holding
higher positions receive greater privileges and immunities.
There are even unpublished laws to grant Party members
or officials special privileges in cases which virtually every
country would consider a serious offense. For instance,
high officials such as provincial party chiefs and cabinet
ministers are given the long, black Hongqi limousine which
is legally excused from having to stop for unexpected
pedestrians or bicyclists. Those who were struck or killed
by Hongqi were not even able to collect civil damages. 32
Recently, there have been many reports of official violation of laws without punishment or remedy in various
PRC publications. 33 On the other hand, if Party officials
lost in a power struggle or were members of a losing faction
or were involved in a counterrevolutionary change, their
fate would be as bad as other people in criminal cases.
Usually, under such circumstances, high officials simply
disappeared while middle and lower cadres could be
brought to trial.
(iii) The political wind of a particular time is one of
the crucial factors in deciding the severity of punishment, if
any, in criminal cases. This is especially true for the socalled counterrevolutionary offenses. This factor is sometimes referred to as "killing the chicken to warn the monkey," that is to say, for political purposes the authorities
will execute or severely punish one individual in order to
warn the public. 34 Thus, typically before national holidays
or festivals, the authorities will select some suspects and
publicly execute them to warm the public not to disrupt
public order or commit robbery or theft during the
festivities.
31. See the cases reported in Cohen, supra note 13, pp. 266-267 (rape on a landlord's
daughter), 293-294 (Cadre's kicking a person to death at a struggling meeting).
32. See Fox Butterfield, "China, for a Fortunate Few at the Top, Is paradise of Privilege and Perquisites," The New York Times, January 2, 1981, p. A6.
33. See the discussion in "Symposium: Which One is Superior-Power or Law,"
Minzhuyu Fazhi, 1980, No. I, pp. 22-24.
34. Wang Ruowang, supra note 21, p. 25.
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During an "epidemic" of theft cases, for example, the authorities may execute a thief with wide publicity. 35 On other occasions
and in a different climate, a person committing theft may simply be
subject to educational lectures and then set free.
A person convicted of making statements contrary to party policy is required to serve his entire sentence, regardless of any subsequent change in party policy which may justify his remarks. For
example, in 1957, some intellectuals were arrested and sent to labor
camps for criticizing the Soviet Union. In the early 1960s, with the
deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations, they requested the PRC authorities to release them because what they said in 1957 turned out to
be right. The authorities rejected the request on the ground that the
statements had challenged Party policy at the time they were made
and therefore still warranted a full sentence.
* * *
In addition to the three extra-legal factors discussed above, in
1979 there began to appear some writings touching on the crucial
question of the relationship between the Party and the administration of justice. It is well known that the Communist Party of China
controls the public security, the procuracy and the courts. However,
until the appearance of these writings the degree of actual control by
the Party was not clear. These writings shed much light on this interesting problem.
Nominally, the PRC has three divisions in the administration of
criminal justice-the public security, the procuracy (between 1951
and 1969 and 1978 to present; see next section) and the courts-but
in practice all are under the direction of the party committee at the
same level and it is the committee that makes decisions as to arrest,
prosecution and sentencing. Since the Party Committee has many
other lines of endeavor and does not have time to review criminal
cases, decision making in criminal cases is in practice delegated to
the Party Committee secretary in charge of political-legal affairs.
This system, in PRC writers' terminology, is called the system of
"deciding a case by the secretary" (Shuji pian in pinyin). 36 A writer
describes this system as follows:
Whether the facts of a case are clear, the evidence is convincing; the defendant should be subject to criminal sane35. See the death sentence of a habitual thief reported in Cohen, supra note 13, pp.
540-541.
36. Liao Jungchang, "The Independence of Trial and [the System of] Deciding a
Case by the Secretary," Xinan Zhengfa Xueyuan Xuehao (Journal of the Southwest Political-Legal Institute), 1979, No. I, p. 7.
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tion and what criminal punishment should be imposed on
the defendant, should be sent to the secretary in charge of
political-legal affairs of the local party committee at the
same level for review and approval. This is called the system of deciding a case by the secretary. 37
The same writer also points out that this system in fact denies
the "trial system and legal process" prescribed by law and makes
trial by the people's court a matter of formality only. 38 The politicallegal secretary is in charge of the public security, the procuracy and
the court of the area under the jurisdiction of the Party Committee,
and before a case is referred to the people's court for trial, the secretary must have previously approved the investigation and prosecution of the accused; similarly, the secretary must have previously
decided the punishment to be imposed. Since the relationship between the secretary and the people's court at the same level is that
between a superior and a subordinate, the court has no choice but to
accept the instruction of the secretary.
The secretary's handling of cases is simple, efficient-and frequently careless. The position of political-legal secretary at the Party
Committee is not a full-time job, and the secretary is concurrently in
charge of many other administrative duties. He neither reviews the
files of the accused nor personally investigates each case. He usually
reviews and decides criminal cases only once in a one- or two-month
period. 39 According to a study on judicial work by a group of teachers and cadres of a Political-Legal Institute who assisted ip handling
accumulated criminal cases in a province between September 1974
and October 1978, the system of deciding a case by the secretary has
the following problems:
(I) The secretary has voluminous tasks to do and sometimes it is not possible for him to decide cases for several months, thus causing delay in the timely handling
of cases.
(2) The secretary's decision on cases usually takes the
form of "surprise attack"; i.e., he decides several or
even several dozen cases at one time. It is not possible
for him carefully to study the facts, evidence and the
nature of each individual case.
(3) If a court disagrees with the handling of a case by the
37. Ibid
38. Ibid., p. 8.
39. Ibid, p. 9.
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Party Committee (i.e., by the political-legal secretary),
there is no rule prescribing that the court can request
the Party Committee to reconsider the case. The rule
is "whatever is approved (by the Party Committee)
should be executed."
(4) Since arrest and sentencing are all decided by the secretary on behalf of the Party Committee, in the course
of trial by the people's court, the court has no choice
but to sentence the accused in accordance with the decision of the Party Committee, even if the result is
contrary to law. For example, in one case, a truck
driver accepted a bribe of more than 800 Renminbi
(People's dollars; approximately one people's dollar is
worth $0.50 U.S.) and in 1976 the Party Committee
decided that he should be subject to criticism, probation of his party membership status and restitution of
the money. However, the driver argued several times
with the Party secretary on the correctness of the
figure of the bribed money received, so in 1977 the
Party secretary instructed the judicial organ to arrest
him and sentence him to nine years imprisonment.
(5) When the secretary decides a case incorrectly, his attitude is "an official will never regret his decision"; the
secretary consistently refuses to correct his mistakes.
For example, in a city a homicide suspect had been
detained for eighteen years despite the fact that the
higher-level judicial organ had already decided that
there was no evidence proving his guilt. He was held
because the leadership insisted that in order "to maintain the decision of the city party committee" he
should not be released. 40

* * *
Despite the emergence of many writings on legal reform, there
appears to have been no discussion of another crucial problem-the
administrative sanctions imposed by the public security organs.
These are in fact criminal sanctions in a disguised form. There are
two types of administrative sanctions in the PRC, the Security Administrative Punishment Act and Rehabilitation Through Labor
(Laodong jiaoyang), neither of which is subject to judicial review.
40. "Looking at Some Problems Relating to Judicial Works from the Practice of
Handling Cases." Xinan Zltengfa Xueyuan Xuebao, 1979, No. I, pp. 26-27.
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The Security Administrative Punishment Act (SAPA) is not a
unique PRC devise, having existed in pre-war Japan and Germany
under the name of the police offense law. 41 Under the SAPA, the
police can issue warnings, require an offender to make compensation
to a victim, impose a fine (0.50 to 30 Renminbi), confiscate articles or
objects involved in a case and detain a person up to 15 days. 42 What
is unique in the PRC's SAPA, compared with the police offense laws,
is that those who are detained under SAPA must assume the cost of
their own living expense or, if unable to pay, must do equivalent
labor to earn their living expenses. 43 Another unique feature is that
the police are empowered to impose sanctions on acts not specifically
prohibited in the SAPA by analogy. 44 Moreover, those whose SAPA
"punishment has been completed, persons who are habitual loafers,
who do not engage in proper employment and who repeatedly violate security administration may be sent to organs of rehabilitation
through labor if they require such rehabilitation." 45
The sanction of rehabilitation through labor was designed to
control vagrants, minor offenders, troublemakers who did not work
properly or who refused to comply with work assignments or transfer and people who were unemployed because they had been expelled from their place of work for a breach of discipline or for being
labeled a rightist. 46 There is no time limit for placing a person under
rehabilitation. Thus, those intellectuals who were labeled rightists in
the 1956-57 Hundred Flower Movement and the Anti-Rightist Campaign were detained for rehabilitation through labor for almost 20
years. The treatment of these people is similar to those who are subject to the criminal sanction of reform through labor. 47

* * *
Besides the structural and organizational problems of the PRC
legal system stated above, recent PRC publications have also revealed many serious problems in its judicial practice. The following
is a concise summary of four major problems raised by these
publications:
41. See Thomas L. Blakemore, "Post-War Development in Japanese Law," Wisconsin Law Review, 1947, pp. 650, and Karl Loewensteon, "Law and the Legislative Process
in Occupied Germany: II," Yale Law Journal, Vol. 57 (1948), pp. 1018-1019.
42. See Cohen, supra note 13, pp. 200-237.
43. Article 3 of the SAPA. Cohen, supra note 13, p. 205.
44. Article 31 of the SAPA. Cohen, supra note 13, p. 220.
45. Article 30 of the SAPA. Cohen, supra note 13, p. 250.
46. See Cohen, supra note 13, p. 249.
47. Amnesty International Report, supra note I9, pp. 82-83.
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1. Tortures, either physical or psychological, were
frequently employed to extract confessions. This is referred to in a recent law book as the principle that "counterrevolutionary cases can be uncovered through the use of
beating by sticks."48
2. The attitude of "rather left than right" in conducting trials is a general phenomenon; that is to say, the
judge is only interested in accepting evidence to prove the
guilty charge of an accused and rejecting evidence
favorable to an accused. 49
3. An accused can be detained for a long time until
he confesses his crime or the authorities decide to conclude
the case. 50 Some accused have been detained for more
than ten years before judgment. 51
4. Extreme cruelty was often used in executing the
death sentence. Before executing a political prisoner, the
PRC authorities frequently pierced the victim's throat with
a long needle or cut the victim's throat and inserted a steel
tube in order to prevent the victim from shouting "reactionary" slogans at the public mass sentencing and execution meeting. 52
Under this irrational, unpredictable and repressive legal system,
it was reported that thousands of people were killed either in factional fights or by authorities and that 100 million people were persecuted during the Cultural Revolution period of 1966-1976. 53 The
Chinese economy also suffered severely during that period. With the
emergence of the Deng Xiaoping leadership after the coup against
the so-called "Gang of Four" and with Deng's emphasis on modern48. Talks on Criminal Procedure, supra note 29, p. 22.
49. Ibid.
50. Amnesty International Report, supra note 19, p. 49.
51. E.g., Shanghai Public Security Bureau Chief Yang Fang was arrested in 1955
and sentenced to 16 years imprisonment in 1965, after ten years of pre-trial detention.
Chen Weisi and Xiang Wu, "Interview with Yang Fang, "Minzhuyu Fazhi, 1980, No. II,
p. 10.
52. E.g., the execution of Party member Zhang Zhixin was done in this way. See Yu
Dan, "Refute: There is Nothing Serious for Cutting [the Throat Before Execution],"
Minzhuyu Fazhi, 1979, No. I, p. 41 and Sheng Zhuhong,supra note 18, p. 21. The whole
episode was vividly described by an article in an underground publication. See Shi
Ming, "A Good Daughter of the People-Before and After the Heroic Death of Martyr
Zhang Zhixin," Beijing Zhichun (The Spring of Peking), No. 8 (September 28, 1979), pp.
12-19.
53. See Fox Butterfield, "Peking Indictment Accuses Radicals of Killing 34,000,"
The New York Times, November 17, 1980, p. A3.
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ization, it is obvious that substantial reform of the legal system must
be made in order to carry out China's ambitious modernization programs. Without a stable legal system, as the experience of other
countries has indicated, there is no way to develop China's economy.
III. REFORM OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM AND ITS LIMITS
Recent Chinese legal reform to strengthen the so-called "socialist legal system" can be divided into four parts: structural reorganization, enactment of necessary legislation, restoration of a defense
lawyer system and definition of the relations between the Party and
the judiciary. The major reforms and the limits of those reforms are
concisely discussed below.
1. Structural Reorganization.

The PRC Constitution of 1954 and the laws subsequently enacted purported to introduce a number of democratic features to the
judiciary, including the right of legal defense, the principle of public
trial, and the concept of judicial independence. However, the constitution and the laws were ignored after 1957 and in fact suspended
since 1966. In 1975, in the last stage of the Cultural Revolution, the
"Gang of Four," with the approval of Mao, enacted a new constitution to replace the 1954 Constitution. That Constitution not only
placed the Higher People's Court and all courts below that level
under the control of the administrative organ at the same level, but
also abolished the procuracy. 54 The procuratorate's function was absorbed by the public security. This reflected a trend that had begun
in 1959, when the Ministry of Justice was abolished and its function
was taken over by the Ministry of Public Security. 55
·
The new 1978 PRC Constitution revived the people's
procuratorates "to ensure observance of the Constitution and the law
by all the departments under the State Council, the local organs of
state at various levels, the personnel of organs of state and the citi54. See Article 25 of the 1975 Constitution and the analysis in Hungdah Chiu, "The
Judicial System Under the New PRC Constitution," in Michael Lindsay, ed., The New
Constitution of Communist China: Comparative Analysis, Taipei: Institute of International Relations, 1976, pp. 101-102.
55. See the Resolution of the First Meeting of the Second Session of the National
People's Congress of the PRC Relating to Abolition of the Ministry of Justice and Ministry of Supervision (passed on April 4, 1959) in Zhonghua renmin gongheguo fagui huibian
(Collection of laws and regulations of the PRC), Vol. 9, Beijing: Falu chubanshe, 1959,
p. 108.
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zens" (Article 43). 56 It also abolished the provisions on placing
courts under the control of the administrative organ at the same
level.
The Ministry of Justice was restored and was assigned the following tasks:
(i) Judicial administrative work, including organization,
personnel, training of cadres and funds, of the people's courts at all levels;
(ii) Supervision and training of judicial cadres;
(iii) Supervision of the administration of political legal
institutes and training of judicial personnel in various
specialities;
(iv) Supervision of the work of the organizations of lawyers and notaries;
(v) Compilation of codes of laws and decrees; and
(vi) Research on jurisprudence in cooperation with scientific institutes and publication of books and periodicals on law. 57
2.

Enactment of Necessary Legislation

Perhaps the most serious defect of the PRC's legal system was
the lack of legislation for the judiciary and government organs.
Many new laws were enacted in 1979-1980, of which the most important are the Criminal Law58 and the Criminal Procedure Law. 59
The Criminal Law has a total of 192 articles and is divided into
two parts (general principles and specific parts). The law does make
more specific the types of acts subject to criminal sanctions. For instance, it narrows the definition of a counterrevolutionary by
stressing that such a person must have committed some overt act;
apparently, the mere harboring of a damaging thought against "the
dictatorship of the proletariat and the social system" is not a criminal act (Article 90). However, there remain some provisions which
are still quite vague in defining the kinds of conduct that come
within their reach. For instance, Articles 116 and 117 provide penalties for "grave" violations of customs, foreign exchange, tax and
56. English text of the Constitution in Peking Review, Vol. 2I, No. II (March II,
1978), pp. 5-14.
57. See "New Minister of Justice Interviewed," Beijing Review, Vol. 22, No. 42
(March 2, 1979), pp. 3-4.
58. Text published in Renmin Rihao (People's Daily), July 7, 1979, pp. I, 3, 4.
59. Text published in Guangmrng Rihao (Enlightenment Daily), July 8, 1979, pp. I, 2,
3.
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other regulations. These penalties are to be imposed in addition to
the administrative sanctions provided by the regulations themselves,
but nowhere does the law define the term "grave violations."
The most serious defect of the new Criminal Law is its reten~ion
of the analogy principle of the 1951 Counterrevolutionary Act. Article 79 of the Criminal Law provides:
Those who commit acts not explicitly defined in the
specific parts of the criminal law may be convicted and sentenced, after obtaining the approval of the Supreme People's Court, according to the most similar article in the law.
This analogy principle is in conflict with one of the basic maxims of
criminal justice: Nullum crimen sine lege (No crime without a preexisting law making the act a crime), which is also incorporated in
Article II, paragraph 2, of the 1948 International Declaration of
Human Rights. 60 Despite the publication of many writings on law in
the PRC, none has dared to challenge the propriety of including this
principle in the Criminal Law; in fact, almost every commentator
has sought to justify retention of the analogy principle. Most of
them argued that because law cannot be drafted so as to define every
possible criminal offense, the use of analogy is necessary. 61 However, the commentators do not explain why only Mongolia, North
Korea and Albania among the communist countries retain this principle in their criminal law, while other communist countries have all
rejected it.
It is believed that there may be two reasons for the PRC's retention of the principle of analogy in its Criminal Law. First, the function of the Criminal Law, as stated in Article 2, is "to use
punishment to struggle against all counterrevolutionary and other
criminal acts, defend the dictatorship of the proletariat. ..." Thus
the Criminal Law remains primarily an instrument of class struggle
and it is therefore desirable to maintain a certain flexibility so that
the law, if necessary, can be manipulated for political purposes. Sec60. Article II, paragraph 2, provides: "No one shall be held guilty of any penal
offense on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a penal offense, under
national or international law, at the time when it was committed." William W. Bishop,
Jr., International Law, Cases and Materials, 3rd ed., Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown
and Co., 1971, p. 466.
61. See, e.g., Zheng Youtian, Zheng Dingyi and Zhao Changqing, Zhonghua renmin
gonghequo xinfa ;ioen zhishi jianghua (Talks on fundamental knowledge of the criminal
law of the People's Republic of China), [Zhongqin]: Xinan zhengfa xueyuan
xinfaqiaoyan shi, [1979), p. 37, and Tao Xijin, "Problems in the Study of Criminal Law,"
Faxue Yanjiu, 1979, No. 5, p. 7.
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ond, the Criminal Law was poorly drafted (as are most of the PRC
laws), so it is necessary to retain this principle to supplement possible
gaps in the Law. For instance, several PRC writers have cited medical malpractice cases as requiring the principle of analogy. 62 This is
because the Criminal Law does not have provisions on homicide or
bodily injury committed by "a person in the performance of his occupation," in spite of the fact that such provisions exist in almost
every other criminal code.
The new Criminal Procedure Law has a total of 164 articles and
is divided into four parts: General Principles, Establishment of a
Case, Preliminary Investigation and Public Prosecution, and Trial
and Execution. On paper, the new law makes a major step toward
rule by law, rather than by decree or whim. Article 4 provides that
all citizens are equal before the law and that no privileges will be
allowed before law. Earlier, in 1978, the PRC released many intellectuals who had been sent to labor camps during the 1957 AntiRightist Campaign, and in January 1979, the PRC proclaimed a new
policy toward former landlords and rich peasants by announcing
that "as long as former landlords and rich peasants and their descendants support socialism, they will no longer be discriminated
against." 63 Many writers in the PRC also urged that Party members
and officials should be subject to normal criminal process and should
enjoy no privilege before the law.
The Law also gives an accused the right to defend himself or to
hire a lawyer to do so (Article 26), as well as requiring an arrest
warrant and for notification of the family of the arrested within 24
hours (Article 50). 64 It also limits the maximum preliminary deten62. See, e.g., Li Youyi, "On the Stipulation and Analogy of Offenses and Penalties,"
Faxue Yanjiu, 1980, No.5, p. 23.
63. "Policy Towards Descendants of Landlords and Rich Peasants," Beijing Review,
Vol. 22, No.4 (January 26, 1979), p. 8. Whether the cadres do seriously implement this
policy on the local level is far from clear.
64. A new Arrest and Detention Law was promulgated in February 1979 to replace a
similar law promulgated in 1954. See note 5, supra. The new law establishes three conditions for future arrests:
(I) The principal facts relating to the crime committed must be thoroughly investigated;
(2) The crime or crimes must be such that the criminal will be liable, if
convicted, to be sentenced to imprisonment; and
(3) The arrest must be absolutely necessary.
However, under the new law public security organs will be able to detain.major suspects
or persons accused of a crime before obtaining a warrant from the people's court or
procuratorate in such exigent cases as assault and battery, robbery, and seriously undermining work, production, and social orders. Evidence against the detainees must be submitted to the appropriate people's procuratorate within three days or, in special
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tion during an investigation to three months (but the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress may indefinitely extend the
detention period for specific cases) (Article 92) and provides for public trials (Article 110), mandatory review of all death sentences by
the Supreme People's Court (Article 144), and other progressive
measures.
In view of the widespread use of torture and reliance on confessions in criminal trials in the past, the law specifically provides in
Article 32 that "it is strictly forbidden to extort confessions by torture
or under duress and to collect evidence by threat, enticement, deceit
and other 'illegal means'." Article 35 stresses that a judgment may
not be predicated upon a confession unsupported by extrinsic
evidence:
In handing down judgments on all cases, stress shall be
laid on the weight of evidence and on investigation and
study, and no credence shall be given to a statement made
by the accused under examination. When there is only a
statement by the accused and no other evidence available,
the accused shall not be considered guilty and sentenced;
when there is no statement by the accused, but there is full,
conclusive evidence against him, the accused may be considered guilty and sentenced.
In spite of the above-mentioned reforms, the drafters of the new
Criminal Procedure Law nevertheless refused to adopt a fundamental maxim of criminal justice: The presumption of innocence of an
accused until he is proved guilty. This principle is incorporated in
Article II, paragraph I of the International Declaration of Human
Rights and in the criminal procedure law of almost every country. 65
Because the Law did not specifically reject that principle, but just
refused to adopt it, Chinese writers felt that there remained some
room for debating this problem.
A widely circulated textbook on criminal procedure law dismissed this principle outright as bourgeois and unsuitable for China
circumstances, seven days. The procuratorate must either sanction the arrest or order the
release of the detainee within three days. The law further provides that interrogation
must start within 24 hours after any arrest, and the detainee must be released if no positive evidence is found.
65. Article II, paragraph I, provides: "Everyone charged with a penal offense has
the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law in a public trial at
which he has had aU the guarantees necessary for his defense." Cited in Bishop, supra
note 60, p. 466.
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without giving any reasons. 66 Several writers argued that the presumption of innocence may result in setting many criminals free and
would be unfavorable to the struggle against criminals. 67 Another
writer said that this principle is inconsistent with the judicial practice
of China because, in 1980, 95 percent of the persons arrested were
found guilty by the courts. However, he suggested that in borderline
cases where the evidence was insufficient to prove the guilt of the
suspect, this principle should be applied so that the judiciary would
not detain the suspect indefinitely. 68 Two writers nevertheless argued strongly for the adoption of this principle in the criminal process.69 A recently published Chinese law dictionary explained the
presumption of innocence as a bourgeois theory of criminal process
but did not attack it-7° Because the law dictionary is a collective
work, its low-profile handling of this principle seems to indicate that
the debate on this issue has not yet been totally closed.
Another area in which legislation which was badly needed was
in the fields of civil and economic law. As a Chinese article said:
Development of the productive forces in China will necessitate major chan~es in the relations of production as well
as in the superstructure, of which laws, decrees and rules
and regulations form an important component. To this
end, various laws and regulations on economic work, including those for the people's communes and factories, fulfillment of contracts, protection of forests, grasslands and
the environment, will be drafted and gradually perfected.
Judicial organs will be established to arbitrate disputes and
lawsuits between enterprises. 71
So far, the progress in this area has been limited, as at the time of
this writing in April 1981, the Civil Law has not been enacted and
66. Talks on Criminal Procedure, supra note 29, p. 55.
67. See, e.g., Zhang Zipei, "An Analysis of the Principle of 'Presumption of Innocence'," Faxue Yanjiu, 1980, No.3, p. 33, and Liao Zengyun, "Views on the Principle of
'Presumption of Innocence'," Faxue Yanjiu, 1980, No. 5, p. 33.
68. Cheng Guanyzhong, ''The Principle of Presumption of Innocence Should be
Critically Assimilated," Faxue Yanjiu, 1980, No. 4, pp. 35, 36.
69. Wang Bingxin, "A Study on the Principle of 'Presumption of Innocence'," Xinan
Zheng(a Xueyuan Xuehao, 1919, No. 1, pp. 15-5, and Zhao Guangyu, ''The Meaning and
Application of the Principle of 'Presumption of Innocence,'" Faxue Yanjiu, 1981, No. I,
pp. 23-25.
70. Faxue Cidian (Law Dictionary), Shanghai: Shanghai cishu chubanshe, 1980, p.
66.

71. "Prospect and Retrospect, China's Socialist Legal System," supra note 3, p. 30.
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only a few laws relating to foreign investment are in force. 72
3. Restoration of the Defense Lawyer System.
The lawyer system before 1949 was abolished by the Chinese
Communists when they took over mainland China. Beginning in
1955, the PRC tried to introduce "people's lawyers" to its judiciary,
but since the 1957 Anti-Rightists Campaign the profession of lawyer
gradually disappeared. 73 During the Cultural Revolution period,
the Party policy of "dealing leniently with those who confess and
severely with those who resist" strongly discouraged accused persons
from even asserting a defense, so there was little room for a defense
lawyer system.
Both the Constitution of 1978 and the new Criminal Procedure
Law recognize the right of an accused to defend himself, and the
latter also recognizes the right to hire a lawyer to defend one's case. 74
On August 26, 1980, the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress adopted the Provisional Act of the PRC on Lawyers,75 which formally restored the lawyer system. The Act will
enter into force on January 1, 1982, but the PRC has already allowed
certain lawyers to start practice. There is, however, a serious
shortage of lawyers in almost every part of China. 76
4. Defining the Relationship between the Party and the
Judiciary.
The new leadership in the PRC in its post-Mao reform has attempted to some extent to separate the party and the government in
administration. Whether this policy should be applied to the judiciary was an important question in law reform. In July 1979, the President of the Supreme People's Court, Jiang Hua, said he personally
approved the abolition of Party Committee review of cases and
urged further study of this issue. 77 With this green light, scholars
and judicial personnel began a lively discussion. At the First Academic Seminar organized by the Chongqing (Chungking) City Law
72. E.g., The Law on Joint Ventures with Chinese and Foreign Investment, translated in Beijing Review, Vol. 22, No. 29 (July 20, 1979), pp. 3-4.
73. See Shao-chuan Leng,supra note 16, p. 13 and Ruge,supra note 16, pp. 120-121.
74. See Article 26 of the Criminal Procedure Law.
75. Renmin Ribao, August 27, 1980, p. 4.
76. See, e.g., Wang Qinghua, "Why One Cannot Get a Lawyer?" Minzhu yu Fazhi,
1979, No. 2, p. 36.
77. Jiang Hua, "Rectifying Thought Line to Accept New Long March," Minzhu yu
Fazhi, 1979, No.2, p. 4.
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Association on October 22 and 23, 1979, the majority expressed the
following view, as summarized by a participant:
The procuracy and the court should independently exercise
their function; i.e., in handling cases, they should insist to
rely on facts and laws and should not allow any organs,
groups and individuals outside the judicial organs, through
open or secret methods, to interfere. The leadership exercised by the various level party committees toward the cadres of the procuracy and the court should primarily focus
on strict supervision over their executing guidelines and
policy and their strict compliance with and impartial execution of the law.78
At the seminar, the participants also engaged in a sharp debate
over the merits of the system of Party Committee review and approval of the cases. One view was that the system was correct because it served the needs of class struggle at different times and
facilitated the execution of security work. Another view considered
this system to be one of the causes for unjust, false and wrongly decided cases. It was maintained that retainin~ the system of Party
Committee review had resulted in more injustice than justice within
the framework of the socialist legal system. It was said that during
the special period of military control in the early years of liberation,
it had been necessary for the party committee to approve cases, but
that this was an expediency best confined to those early years. After
the promulgation of the Constitution and the organic laws for the
procuracy and the court, the continuance of the system of party committee approval of cases frequently resulted in replacing law with the
Party's policy, which was disadvantageous to perfecting and
strengthening the socialist legal system. The supporters of this view
further pointed out that the approval of cases by the Party Committee in practice is performed by the secretary in charge of politicallegal work alone and that this delegation of authority inevitably resulted in subordinating the law to one individual's view. 79 The conclusion of the participants of the seminar, as reported by one
participant, is as follows:
Based on the experience of thirty years' judicial practice
and in accordance with the situation and special features of
current class struggle, it is entirely correct to have the
78. Li Jinrong, "Chongqing [Chungking] City Law Association Held an Academic
Seminar,'' Xinan Zllengfa Xueyuan Xuehao, 1919, No. 2, p. 59.
79. Ihid
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procuracy and the court to exercise their functions independently and to change the system of party committee's approval of cases. 80
Other writers also supported the separation of the Party and judiciary and argued strongly in favor of restricting Party Committee
leadership over judicial work to guidelines and policies, stopping
short of any functions in reviewing individual cases. 81 In January
1980, the President of the Supreme People's Court publicly said that
Party leadership over judicial work should be limited primarily to
the guidelines and policies of the judiciary and should thoroughly
guarantee that the courts may conduct trials independently. 82 Similarly, the Chief Procurator of the Supreme People's Procuratorate,
Huang Huoqing, also said that "procuratorates at various levels
must be placed under the leadership of the party committee, and
they must report to and seek instruction from the party committee
with respect to major guidelines and policy problems," thus implying
that the Party Committee should not intervene in the handling of
individual cases by the procuratorates. 83
Finally, on August 24, 1980, Jiang Hua told the Beijing Criminal Trials Conference that the Party has decided to abolish the system of Party Committee review and approval of cases. 84 The extent
to which this policy will be fully implemented remains to be seen.
The movement toward law reform, while it has at least apparently attempted to establish a stable legal system, also has two important limitations. First, the PRC still wants to retain some of its
flexible laws for political maneuvering. Thus, the practice of rehabilitation through labor, i.e., the placing of a person in a labor camp
for up to four years, without judicial review, is maintained; 85 and the
80. Ibid.
81. E.g., Liu Guangming, "The People's Courts Administer Justice Independently,
Subject only to the Law, "Faxue Yanjiu, 1919, No. 3, p. 30; Zhang Jinqing and Xie
Bangyu," Independent Administering of Justice and the Leadership of the Communist
Party," Faxue Yanjiu, 1980, No. 2, p. 28; and Zhang Youyu, "Equality of Everyone
Before the Law and Judicial Independence," Minzhu yu Fazhi, 1980, No. 10, p. 3.
82. See Renmin Ribao, January II, 1980, p. I.
83. Ibid.
84. Renmin Ribao, August 25, 1980, p. I; "Chinese Court Official Seeks Less Political
Interference," The New York Times, August 25, 1980, p. AS.
85. On November 29, 1979, the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress passed "Supplementary Regulations Concerning Rehabilitation through Labor,"
which provide, inter alia, for the establishment of a Governing Commission on Rehabilitation through Labor in Provinces, Autonomous Zones, Large and Middle Size Cities.
The duration of rehabilitation through labor is from one to three years and may be extended for another year. Renmin Ribao, November 30, 1979, p. I.
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continued validity of formerly enacted vague criminal legislation,
such as the 1951 Counterrevolutionary Act86 and the State Secret
Act, 87 has been explicitly confirmed. The State Secret Act includes
almost everything in the PRC as "state secrets" and anyone who
leaks those "secrets" to a domestic or foreign enemy is subject to
punishment as a counterrevolutionary. 88
Second, the PRC's legal system is a "Socialist Legal System,"
which, as stated in a recent Chinese law dictionary, means "the principle of handling business strictly according to law under the dictatorship of the proletariat." 89 This is considered to be an "important
condition for consolidating the dictatorship of the proletariat." This
concept is usually referred to in communist legal theory as "socialist
legality" and will be analyzed in the next section.
IV. SOCIALIST LEGALITY, THE CASE OF WEI
JINGSHENG AND THE TRIAL OF THE GANG OF
FOUR AND LIN BIAO CLIQUE
The concepts of socialist legality and socialist democracy
originated in the Soviet Union; between 1954 and 1957, the PRC
tried to establish a government and state structure based on that
model. Since 1957, the Chinese, of course, moved farther and farther away from the Soviet model. However, there is an obvious
trend in China to go back to that model, as is explained below.
According to Soviet concepts of socialist legality and socialist
democracy, legality and democracy are conditioned by the needs of
socialism; the latter needs, in tum, are defined by the Communist
Party in its leadership role. As a consequence, no principle, however
normatively stated in the constitution or law, is permitted to conflict
with the policy needs of the Communist Party. Although these two
concepts do contain the potential for instability and lack of predictability in the legal system, the Soviet legal system does not, as a rule,
operate arbitrarily or in an ad hoc fashion. Stability and predictability are important elements in the ordering of any society, including
86. Despite the promulgation of the Criminal Law, this Act was never abolished and
just a few weeks before the entry into force of new Criminal Law, Wei Jingsheng was
sentenced to 15 years imprisonment in accordance with the 1951 Act. See "Wei Jingsheng Sentenced," Beijing Review, Vol. 22, No. 43, (October 26, 1979), pp. 6-7. For a
discussion of this case, see Hungdah Chiu, "Structural Changes in the Organization and
Operation of China's Criminal Justice System," Review of Socialist Law, Vol. 7, No. I
(March 1981), pp. 62-65.
87. Republished in Renmin Ribao, April II, 1980, pp. I, 3.
88. Anicle 13 of the Act.
89. Faxue Cidian, supra note 70, p. 352.
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Soviet society, so these two elements are embodied in Soviet socialist
legality and socialist democracy. However, the stability and predictability which are part of socialist legality and socialist democracy do
not inhibit arbitrary state action in areas of special Party concern,
such as the security of the regime and the integrity of the Communist
system. 90 This distortion of the legal system appears, for example, in
the so-called dissidents' cases.
While there is no doubt that the members of the present PRC
leadership have made serious efforts to strengthen the legal system
and to carry out necessary legal reform, they also made it clear that
the legal system can only operate within the so-called "Four Basic
Principles"-namely, keeping to the socialist road, upholding the
dictatorship of the proletariat, Party leadership and Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought. 91 Thus, regardless of the present leadership's pledge to the rule of law, if an individual attempted to
challenge one or more of the four basic principles, it would be futile
for that person to rely on the socialist legal system to guarantee him
a fair trial. The case of Wei Jingsheng is an example.
Wei Jingsheng was a native of Anhui Province, in Central
China, where he was born in 1950. Both of his parents were Party
officials, and he was intensively indoctrinated with Communist theories from his childhood. During the Cultural Revolution, he joined
the Red Guards in 1966, but was jailed for four months early in
1967. With the gradual subsidence of the Cultural Revolution in
1969, Wei enlisted in the People's Liberation Army, which enabled
him to travel widely through China. Demobilized in 1973, he turned
down an offer to become an official and took a job as an electrician
in the Peking Zoo. 92
In December 1978 Wei began an underground sheet called Tanshuo (Exploration) and posted it on Xidan Wall, the now-abolished
"Democracy Wall," in Peking. It included an essay bearing his signature and calling on the Communist leaders to add a fifth item to
their official list of modernizations the country should achieve in agriculture, industry, science and defense. The fifth and most necessary, he wrote, was democracy, 93 not socialist democracy under the
90. See Bernard Ramundo, The Soviet Legal System, A Primer, Chicago: American
Bar Association, I971, pp. 22-28.
91. "Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation (April-June 1979)," The China Quarterly, No. 79 (September 1979), p. 670.
92. See Fox Butterfield, "Imprisoned Chinese Dissident Leader, Wei Jingsheng,"
The New York Times, October 20, 1979, p. 9.
93. Part of Wei's article, "The Fifth Modernization-Democracy and Others," is
translated in "China Clamps Down on Dissidents," The Asian Wall Street .Journal

SOCIALIST LEGALISM

25

leadership of Communist Party.
Later, Exploration became a mimeographed magazine publishing many articles exposing the human rights situation in China. For
instance, in the March 1979 issue of Exploration, an article entitled
"The Bastille of the Twentieth Century-Qincheng (Ch 'in ch 'eng in
Wade-Giles) No. I Prison" 94 vividly described the inhumane treatment and torture of political prisoners in China. On March 29, 1979,
Wei was arrested.
On October 16, 1979, more than six months after his arrest, Wei
was brought to trial by the Peking Municipal Intermediate People's
Court and sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment, with deprivation of
political rights for an additional three years. Wei was convicted of
providing a foreigner with Chinese military intelligence and carrying
out counterrevolutionary agitation. 95
Wei Jingsheng lodged an appeal against the court's judgment to
the Peking Municipal Higher People's Court. On November 6, 1979,
in one day's time, this court concluded the debate between the prosecutor and Wei and rejected the appeal. 96 Under the PRC's legal process, the case was thus affirmed; no further appeal to the Supreme
People's Court is permitted. 97
A thorough analysis of the merits of the prosecution and Wei's
defense is beyond the scope of this paper. Here, the focus is primarily on the procedural aspects of the case. First, although a notice on
the wall of the court on October 16 had said that the trial of Wei
would be open to the public, none of Wei's family members or
friends were allowed to enter the court room. Foreign correspondents were turned away. Several hundred spectators were taken in,
but a woman who attended said afterward that she had received her
ticket the day before the trial at her work place and had been instructed to attend. 98
------------------------------Weekly, December 3, 1979, p. 10. Complete text can be found in Da/u dixia kanwu
huibian (Ta-/u t'i-hsia k'an-wu hui-pien in Wade-Giles), Collection of the Mainland Underground Publications), Book I, Taipei: Institute for the Study of Chinese Communist
Problems, 1980, pp. 2-11.
94. See Fox Butterfield, "Peking Dissident, in Rare Account, Tells of Political Prisoners' Torture," The New York Times, May 7, 1979, pp. AI, AIO.
95. See "Wei Jingsheng Sentenced," supra note 86.
96. "The People's Verdict-Wei Jingsheng's Appeal Rejected," Beijing Review, Vol.
22, No. 46 (November 16, 1979), pp. 15-16.
97. See Xing Zhong, "Judicial Organs and Judicial Procedure in China," Beijing Review, Vol. 22, No. 2 (January 12, 1979), p. 32.
98. See Fox Butterfield, "Leading Chinese Dissident gets 15-year Prison Term," The
New York Times, October 17, 1979, p. A3.
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Second, the Court apparently was not confident of the legal basis, under the 1951 Counterrevolutionary Act, upon which the charge
and sentence against Wei were based. The court therefore invoked
the catch-all Article 16 provision allowing for punishment for crime
by analogy. 99
Third, one of the charges against Wei was that he supplied military secrets regarding the Sino-Vietnamese War to a foreigner. In
regard to the question of proof required for a conviction, it is instructive to note that the foreigner to whom the secrets were allegedly
supplied was neither called to testify nor identified. However, one
spectator said that the prosecutor, during the reading of a two-hour
indictment, had mentioned several countries, including Great Britain and France. 100 If the recipient was indeed a national of one of
these countries, then Article 6, paragraph 1 of the 1951 Counterrevolutionary Act on "supplying intelligence to a domestic or foreign enemy" was certainly not applicable, because Great Britain and France
definitely are not "enemies" of the PRC today. Ironically, the day
before Wei's trial, Hua Guofeng, the PRC's Communist Party
Chairman and then Prime Minister, began his three-week visit to
four European countries, including France and Great Britain .

•••

If the handling of a case through regular legal procedure would
undermine or tarnish the leadership of the Communist Party of
China, then under the concept of socialist legality, legal procedure
could be disregarded or distorted to suit Party policy. The trials of
the "Gang of Four" and the Lin Biao Clique illustrate the
supremacy of the Party over law.
First, since these trials were essentially political in nature, it was
politically desirable to include among the judges and procurators
representatives of all factions opposing the Gang of Four and the
Lin Biao Clique, so as to demonstrate the unity of these factions
against their common enemy. Moreover, no group in the PRC can
retain power without the support of the military, so the participation
of the military in the trials was politically essential. For these reasons, the regular courts were disregarded and a special court was
created 101 to handle the trials so that the selection of judges and
99. See supra note 15, and accompanying text.
100. See Fox Butterfield, supra note 98.
101. See the decision of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress
adopted on September 29, 1980. "Principal Culprits of the Counter-Revolutionary Cliques of Lin Biao and Jiang Qing to be Tried," Beijing Review, Vol. 23, No. 40 (October 6,
1980), p. 3.
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procurators could satisfy the requirements of the Party and the
military. 102
Second, because of the political nature of the trials, the unity of
the judges in conducting the trials and rendering the sentences was
essential. This unity could be guaranteed only if each and every
judge had a personal grievance against the defendants. While a
judge in the PRC would rarely, if ever, refuse to follow Party directives as to the outcome of a judicial case, the PRC sought to avoid
the slightest risk of possible deviation in these politically sensitive
cases. For this reason, the procedures for the Gang of Four trials
completely ignored Article 23 of the Criminal Procedure Law requiring the withdrawal of judges and other participants who may be parties to the case or close relatives of the parties or who may have an
interest in the case or whose close relatives may have an interest in
the case. For example, both Jiang Hua, chief judge of the special
court, and Huang Huoqing, chief procurator of the special
procuratorate, were among the alleged victims listed in the indictment. 103 Among the thirty-five judges, at least twenty had allegedly
been persecuted during the Cultural Revolution, and most of the
others were directly related to people who had suffered similarly. 104
Third, the PRC has decided to keep Mao Zedong thought as an
official ideology. It was therefore essential to ensure that Mao's image would not be irreparably tarnished in the trials. On this point, a
senior Chinese general wrote recently: "Just imagine: what would
take the place of Mao Zedong thought if it were really abandoned?"10 Recently, the Communist Party has been seriously concerned by evidence that increasing numbers of people-especially
young pe~jle-have shown little enthusiasm for socialism or Communism.' If the Party wants to remain in power, its leaders realize,
102. For instance, one of the deputy chiefs of the special procuratorate, Shi Jingqian,
is deputy-director of the General Political Department of the People's Liberation Army

(PLA). Wu Ziuquan, deputy chief of the General Staff of the PLA, was appointed chief
judge of the second tribunal of the special court. See note 101, supra.
103. See the Indictment of the Special Procuratorate, November 2, 1980. Renmin
Ribao, November 21, 1980, p. 2. Reprinted also inFeijing Yuebao (Fei-chingyueh-pao in
Wade-Giles, Chinese Communist Affairs Monthly), Vol. 23, No.6 (December 1980), p.
79.
104. See James P. Sterba, "Former Chinese Leaders Given Long Prison Terms," The
New York Times, January 26, 1981, p. A3.
105. See General Huang Kecheng's article in April 10, 1981 Liberation Army Daily,
reported in Bradley K. Martin "Chinese critique of Mao cites 'shortcomings' and 'mistakes' of later years," The Sun (Baltimore), April 12, 1981, p. A4.
106. See Fox Butterfield, "Apathy Replaces Marxist Idealism Among Chinese," The
New York Times, December 30, 1980, p. AI.
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it cannot afford to offer the people a free choice of ideologies or they
may well choose to throw the Communists out. For this reason, the
"open trial" requirement of the Criminal Procedure Law was not
strictly followed; the PRC leaders did not want to provide the defendants, especially Mao's wife, Jiang Qing, the opportunity to shift
the blame to Mao in a public forum, attributing all their alleged
crimes to Mao's instructions. 107
Fourth, the PRC has been committed to publishing the judgment rendered by the trials, but it does not want to disclose the full
. details of the intra-Party power struggle since such a disclosure
would severely tarnish the party's image among the people. For this
reason, the judgments failed to establish a direct causal link between
the defendants and the numerous deaths that took place during the
Cultural Revolution. As a result, the judgments frequently referred
vaguely to the "persecution to death" of many victims of the Cultural Revolution, but presented no direct evidence linking the Gang
of Four with any of the deaths. 108
Fifth, for similar reasons, the defendants' right of defense, guaranteed by the 1978 Constitution and Article 26 of the Criminal Procedure Law, was virtually abrogated. Those defendants who chose
to defend themselves were denied the right to call witnesses. They
had requested and were prevented from seriously cross-examining
the prosecution witnesses. Similarly, for the five defendants who
chose to appoint or accept the court's appointment of defense counsel, their lawyers did not play any active role in their protection or
defense. None of the defense lawyers objected to any of the prosecution's questions or asked to cross-examine a single witness. In the
case ofYao Wenyuan, a former Polibureau member, his lawyer only
made his case worse. Yao only acknowledged that he had committed mistakes but denied the allegation that he had controlled and
used the mass media to agitate an overthrow of the dictatorship of
the proletariat. His defense lawyer, however, said that Yao was one
107. The PRC had claimed that it was an "open trial" in the sense that "the various
provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities directly under the central government,
political parties, people's organizations, government organs and PLA can send representatives to attend the trials as observers." See supra note 101,.
None of these observers, however, was permitted to make any comment on the trials, other than to praise the proceedings as fair. Moreover, the 30 Chinese media correspondents who had been invited to observe the trial were not allowed to issue any
individual report; all news concerning the trials was uniformly released by the Xinhua
News Agency.
108. See Richard Berstein, "'Gang of 4' Trial Dramatic But Case Far From Proved,"
Washington Star, December 14, 1980, p. All.
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of the main culprits of a counterrevolutionary clique led by Jiang
Qing, thus refuting his argument of only committing mistakes. 109
Finally, in order to bring these politically sensitive trials to a
speedy conclusion and thereby avoid undue publicity for the defendants, the right of appeal was denied to the defendants. This is contrary to the Criminal Procedure Law and even to the PRC practice
before the implementation of this law.U 0

V. CONCLUSION
The PRC's recent legal reforms, even with the limitations stated
above, if substantially but not fully implemented, would establish a
more stable "socialist" legal system. Such a system certainly would
be beneficial to the PRC's ambitious modernization program. However, whether the PRC will actually implement these legal reforms,
at least in their most substantial aspects, remains questionable. On
the positive side, the present leadership appears to understand fully
that the Chinese legal system must be strengthened and perfected so
as to provide an orderly, predictable environment for the national
modernization program. Moreover, during the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution, the lack of discipline among the people, workers,
and pe·asants seriously affected production on various levels; there
were also serious problems, including inefficiency, corruption and
waste, in the operation of state enterprises. To put its house in order,
it will also be necessary to re-establish social discipline and order
and to put the operation of state enterprises in order through the
mechanism of law. Furthermore, the experience of the Cultural
Revolution, in which the present leadership and their followers were
also victims, seems to have taught the present leaders that a more
stable and less repressive legal system is not just for the benefit of the
great majority of the Chinese people but also for the benefit of the
leaders themselves and their followers.
On the other hand, one must realize certain important negative
elements concerning the establishment of a stable legal system in
China. The modem type of legal system with a separation of power
among the police (public security), procurator and the courts was
unknown to traditional China. The thirty years of Communist rule
further strengthened, rather than weakened, that tradition. In order
to overcome that obstacle embedded deeply in Chinese tradition, the
leadership must make every effort to comply fully with the laws they
109. "Report from the Court, Special Court Continues Debates" Beijing Review, VoL
23, No. 52 (December 29, 1980), pp. 18-19.
110. See Xing Zhong, supra note 97, p. 32.
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promulgate and to show to the people that they are serious about
implementing the laws. To select the Gang of Four and Lin Biao
Clique Trials to publicize the new legal system was, in its context, an
unwise decision because, as analyzed in previous sections, the trials
were conducted in gross violation of the newly promulgated Criminal Procedure Law. Instead of enhancing respect for law, to many
people the trials cast serious doubts on the sincerity of the present
leadership's purported goal of establishing a just legal system. As a
western correspondent reported:
"We all know it is not a trial but a power struggle," [one
Chinese said]. "If Jiang Qing had won, it would be Deng
who is on trial, or worse, hauled before a mass rally. . . ."
The leaders may be disappointed by these sentiments,
which have been expressed by many people. They evidently hoped that the trial would not only finally exorcise
the ghost of the Cultural Revolution but also show progress
toward establishing a fair legal system.
Instead the trial has raised some serious questions
. .
about JUStice.
. . . 111
Second, the Chinese society, instead of practicing the egalitarianism that some China scholars ascribed to the PRC, has been a
strict class society since 1949. A higher rank in the Party, government or military units provides greater access to the amenities of life
which cannot be purchased by money. Also, the higher one's position, the greater one's privileges and immunities. These privileges
and immunities also extend to one's children, relatives, and occasionally to close friends. 112 Since the PRC relies on the loyalty of
this privileged class to control the people, it would be difficult for the
leadership to enforce the principle of equality of everyone before the
law.
Third, the lack of a sufficient number of trained legal personnel
to run the new legal system is another serious problem. It has been
estimated that the PRC needs two-hundred thousand legal personnel.113 However, since 1949 the PRC has turned out only several
thousand law graduates, with only several hundred more graduating
since 1979. The courts and the procuratorates are now staffed with
Ill. Fox Butterfield, "Revenge Seems to Outweigh Justice at Chinese Trial." The New

York Times, December 6, 1980, p. 2.
112. See note 32 J191ra.
· 113. Fox Butterfield, "Definition of Crimes Clarified by Peking," The New York
Times, July 10, 1979, p. All, quoting the view of Qing Duansheng, a Harvard-trained
political scientist in the PRC.

SOCIALIST LEGALISM

31

many persons who lack formal legal training. In 1975, it was reported that the majority of judges came from among the ranks of
peasants, workers and military personnel. 114 The moral quality, not
to question the legal training, of at least some of these judges is also
poor, as revealed by some recent cases. In one case, the president of
a tribunal raped a female involved in a bigamy case. 115 One recent
article said that a substantial number of judicial works accepted
bribes and rendered judgments against innocent people while they
set criminals free. 116 General Ye Jienying, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, said in December
1978 that "there must be fearless procurators and judges who are
ready to sacrifice their lives to uphold the dignity of the legal system" if China wants to make its legal system perfect} 17 However,
the harshness of the penalties for incorrect thought and expression,
combined with a long history of political upheaval, make it unlikely
that such fearless procurators and judges will soon emerge in the
PRC. When the penalty for a politically incorrect judgment may be
conviction of the judge himself as a counterrevolutionary or punishment by rehabilitation through labor, the reasons for judicial timidity are self-evident. In 1957, four Supreme Court judges did speak
out on how to improve the administration of justice in China, but
they were soon declared rightists and have not been heard from since
then.U 8
Fourth, the PRC's high crime rate 119 and the social disturbances, 120 both caused primarily by high unemployment rate, 121 may
also induce the present leadership to resort to drastic, extra-legal
114. Ruge, supra note 16, p. 121.
115. "President of A Tribunal Arrested for Raping a Litigant," Minzltu yu Fazhi,
1980, No. ll, p. 33.
116. Commentator, "We Should Guarantee that Law Will be Enforced," Minzltu yu
Fazlti, 1980 No. l, p. 12.
ll7. "Speeding the work of Lawmaking," Beijing Re~iew, Vol. 22, No. 9 (March 2,
1979), p. 3.
118. See Leng, supra note 16, p. 55.
119. See the Report of the Chief Procurator Huang Huoqing to the Third Session of
the Fifth National People's Congress, September 2, 1980. He observed that the "social
order was not stable and number of crimes has increased." He also said that between
January and June of 1980, more than 84,000 criminal offenders were prosecuted and
among them more than 50% were serious current criminal elements. Renmin Ribao, September 17, 1980, p. l.
120. See, e.g., Bradley K. Martin, "Disturbances are noted in Peking," The Sun (Baltimore), April 14, 1981, p. A2.
121. It is reported by various sources that China has at least 20 million unemployed in
an urban population of about 200 million. See Fox Butterfield, "The Pragmatists Take
China's Helm," The New York Times Mazagine, December 28, 1980, p. 22.
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measures, such as placing a city under military control, rather than
solving such problems through regular legal process.
Assuming the PRC may be able to overcome the above-stated
difficulties in establishing a socialist legal system based on its recent
reforms, the resulting legal system, even by Soviet standards, would
be far from reasonable and satisfactory. A reasonably operated socialist legal system should reduce the number of political prisoners to
a tolerable degree. In the Stalinist period, there were several million
political prisoners in the Soviet Union; that number has since been
reduced to about ten thousand today. 122 Despite the recent PRC effort to create a fair legal system and to prevent a renewal of the
arbitrary persecution of the Cultural Revolution period, the PRC
still operates a vast network of labor reform camps populated by
hundreds of thousands of prisoners, a substantial number of whom
are undoubtedly political prisoners. PRC officials and legal publications refuse to discuss the labor camps problem. The miserable conditions of the labor camps were vividly described by Bao Ruewang
in his Prisoner ofMao ,12 To date, there is no evidence that the PRC
has any intention to make any significant reform of the Chinese Gulags. In 1979, the PRC republished its old rules about labor reform,
and the Guangming (Enlightenment) Daily even praised the success
·
of the labor camp system. 124
Finally, thirty years of political uncertainty and policy shifts
have instilled a sense of cynicism in the people of the PRC about the
durability of the current regime's commitment to the rule of law.
Many Chinese understandably often wonder whether the pendulum
of Chinese politics may again swing, as in times past, to the left,
bending the law to the political wind and to the dictates of a major
mass campaign. Be that as it may, it would be incorrect to view the
PRC's effort to reform the legal system as insignificant. The PRC,
having endorsed and publicized a fairly detailed description of its
effort to reform the legal system as revealed in its recent legislations,
has put itself in a position where it has a political stake in the general
implementation of legal reform. Therefore, one might expect some
modest progress rather than some retrenchment, in China's legal
reform.
122. PriSoners of Conscience in the l/SSR: Tlzeir Treatment and Conditions, London:
Amnesty International, 1975, p. 53.
123. New York: Coward, McCann & Geoghegan, Inc., 1973; Penguin Books edition,
1976. See also Amnesty International Report, supra note 19, pp. 105-131.
124. See Fox Butterfield, "Hundreds of Thousands Toil in Chinese Labor Camps,"
Tlte New York Times, January 3, 1981, pp. I, 4.
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